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ABSTRACT 
Abalone fisheries in Australia and New Zealand are managed at scales of 100s of kilometers 
with zonal Legal Minimum Lengths (LML) and Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQ), for 
commercial divers, and short fishing seasons, trip and possession limits for the recreational 
sector. Abalone resources are comprised of many independent populations which vary widely 
in their size of maturity. Under focused fishing pressure local populations with larger sizes of 
maturity have relatively little of their breeding stock protected by a zonal LML. Populations 
with a large size of maturity relative to the zonal LML are prone to local extinction. A 
gardening approach to abalone management would allow cultivators to learn optimal shell 
sizes and harvest rates for individual reefs while allowing government agencies to withdraw 
into the role of regulator and advisor. 
 
Optimizing abalone production necessitates changing the nature of existing property rights 
from an allocation of zonal catch (ITQ), into a right to harvest a defined area; Territorial 
User Rights Fishery (TURF). Among the institutional impediments to this reform are the 
complex allocation issues involved. The first concerns the mechanism by which agencies and 
stake holders could agree to change existing commercial allocations into an equitably 
proportional allocation of the harvestable area. Two proposed mechanisms illustrate the 
essential elements required; equity, transparency and independence from outside influence. 
The second issue concerns allocation between the commercial sector, recreational and 
traditional harvesters, and non-extractive users. The current systems generally avoid 
explicitly allocating shares between these sectors TURF management necessitates making this 
allocation explicit.   
 
Keywords: abalone, TURF, management reform, re-allocation 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Gulland (1969) stressed that at the basis of all fishery assessment models was the 
assumption that the unit of stock being fished had a level of homogeneity and mixing 
such that it comprised a uniform population that it could respond uniformly to fishing 
and management. There is a growing realisation that many marine resources are not 
large uniform resources amenable to regional assessment and management strategies 
(Hilborn et al. 2005). Instead many resources are composed of a mosaic of relatively 
independent and variable sub-stocks that effectively comprise micro-fisheries within 
the boundaries of existing scales of assessment and management (Prince 2005). With 
broad scale regional management fishing pressure is applied differentially across 
component micro-stocks, being focussed on the most attractive areas according to a 
sliding scale of preferences evaluated primarily on the basis of proximity, 
accessibility, safety and profitability. The most attractive abalone beds during any 
period are sequentially fished into localized recruitment collapses and even localized 
extinction causing an escalating long term loss of overall productivity. Hilborn et al. 
(2005) go so far as to claim that currently unrecognised and inappropriate spatial 
structure is one of the principal reasons that fisheries assessment and management 
unexpectedly fail. 
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One of the challenges facing fisheries assessment and management in the 21st century 
is to reduce the scale at which management and assessment processes are 
implemented reducing them to the sub-regional and local scales of the component 
micro-stocks of many resources. So that the basic assumption of ‘functional units of 
stock’, as described originally by Gulland (1969), becomes at least vaguely valid.  
 
This paper uses the Australian abalone (Haliotid) fishery as a case study of the 
allocation issues this change raises.  
 
Regional Management of Abalone in Australia and New Zealand 
Abalone are valuable herbivorous molluscs found on shallow coastal reefs around 
many of the world’s coastlines. They are highly prized by Asian markets as a ‘truffle 
of prosperity’, but despite large investments in aquaculture, sea ranching and wild 
stock management global annual production has declined from around 29,000t in 
1969 to below 10,000t today (Prince 2004). In spite of the billions spent since the 
1950s on reseeding, aquaculture, and wild stock management there have been no well 
documented accounts of the broad scale recovery of lost abalone productivity (Prince 
2004). Only devastating evidence of how they can be virtually eliminated through 
large regions of their former distribution along the North American Pacific, Atlantic 
European and Eastern Australian coastlines. Since the collapse of large resources 
along the Californian and Mexican west coast, and with the continuing long slow 
decline of the Japanese resource, Australia’s fishery producing about 5,000t per 
annum is approximately 50%, while New Zealand with around 1000t per annum is 
abut 10% of global production. 
 
Without fully understanding the actual causes, but mindful of the spectacular stock 
declines observed in Mexico and California during the middle of the 20th Century, and 
the slower long term decline being observed in Japan, the abalone fisheries of 
Australian and New Zealand have been managed rigorously and pro-actively, 
although regionally, since the 1960s.  Legal Minimum Lengths (LML) were generally 
introduced during the 1960s, limited entry and transferable licenses for divers during 
the late 1960s and early 1970s, and Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQ) and 
cautious regional Total Allowable Catches (TACs) in the mid-1980s (Prince & 
Shepherd 1992). This pro-active and generally cautious management has undoubtedly 
done much to preserve these resources and to date has prevented the spectacular 
collapses observed in along the Pacific coasts of Canada, USA and Mexico, or the 
long slow decline observed in the Japanese resource. 
 
Abalone Fisheries Ecology 
A series of parallel and complementary studies funded by the Australian 
Government’s Fisheries Research and Development Corporation (FRDC) and its 
antecedents during the 1980s and early 1990s provide a good basis for understanding 
the factors underlying the problematic nature of sustaining abalone fisheries. Prince 
(2004, 2005) review the factors that undermine orthodox regional management 
strategies. Adult movement and larval movements are generally limited to scales of 
10s – 1,000s of meters, while abalone growth and size of maturity is highly variable 
over local and regional scales, being largely determined by food supply, water 
movement and temperature. Upon maturing abalone emerge from interstitial spaces 
within the coastal reefs and join adult feeding and breeding aggregations. These 
aggregations are highly visible making it easy for divers to learn their location and 
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effectively target them for collection. Where the size of maturity on a reef is around or 
greater than a regional Legal Minimum Length (LML) the aggregated breeding stock 
is extremely prone to complete removal, as are successive juvenile year classes when 
they begin the maturation process and emerge from their cryptic habitat to reform 
adult aggregations. 
 
The fisheries ecology of abalone has important implications for the management of 
abalone fisheries. They are not the single freely mixing “units” of stock assumed by 
most management and assessment models. Instead they are comprised of many 
(1,000s - 10,000s) relatively independent and variable self-recruiting units, or micro-
stocks.  In this situation a ‘Tragedy of Scale’ occurs and regional management fails to 
control exploitation pressure on component local stocks (Prince et al. 1998). Where 
regional LMLs fail to protect sufficient breeding stock individual reefs are vulnerable 
to localized recruitment overfishing. Reefs favored by divers because they are close to 
home ports, contain uniformly legal sizes abalone, are relatively sheltered or shallow 
become depleted while less favored reefs may remain relatively lightly exploited. 
Rehabilitation is not technically difficult, re-introducing, or re-building and protecting 
breeding stock restores local productivity, however, under current relatively open 
(local scale) access arrangements there is no guaranteed reward for such altruistic 
long term behavior. Despite ‘world best practice’ management a ‘Tragedy of the 
Commons’ still occurs at the scale of individual reefs (Hardin 1968) and the 
productivity of a valuable resource is being incrementally lost. 
 
In Australian and New Zealand the serial loss of productive area is being increasingly 
observed and reported by active divers across all spatial scales (100 m – 100 km), and 
although the averaging effect of regional scale stock assessment largely hides the 
decline from official assessments TACs in most jurisdictions have been trending 
down for several years. The need for more spatially explicit management of abalone 
fisheries was identified more than a decade ago in reviews by Prince and Shepherd 
(1992) and McShane (1995). Until recently the response of management to this 
challenge has been to increasingly regionalize the existing centralized government 
driven management framework of the fishery, introducing a growing number of zonal 
size limits and catch limits. Challenging this trend is the escalating level of 
government resources required to reliably monitor and assess stock abundance, and to 
enforce catch levels and LMLs, across a proliferating number of zones within each 
region. 
 
REFORMING ABALONE MANAGEMENT 
The solution to the Tyranny of Scale is to engage the intelligent behaviour of the 
divers who relate to the resource at the fine scale appropriate to abalone ecology. 
Currently only their hunter-gatherer facilities are being utilized. Their capacity to be 
assessors and managers has largely been ignored. As a matter of course divers 
memorize the location of each aggregation, the size of the aggregation and the size 
and appearance of the abalone in each aggregation. This basic information routinely 
memorised by divers can be turned to positive use in the assessment and management 
process.  
 
A recent initiative pioneered by the Victorian Western Abalone Divers’ Association 
(WADA) since 2001, and now with FRDC support being extended to five regions 
across Victoria, South Australia and NSW seeks to train divers in the subtle changes 
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in shell shape and appearance that occur as abalone mature. On this basis the divers 
are trained to observe whether their catch is comprised primarily of immature or fully 
fecund individuals, and assess the status of each reef. Using these assessments 
regional associations of divers and quota owners are brokering their own local 
arrangements for the managing their resources on a reef by reef basis. Using this 
approach the Victorian management agency is working with their industry 
associations to implement a range of voluntary and regulated finer scale arrangements 
which distribute TACs and vary LMLs across the component reefs of each zone. 
These voluntary arrangements are codified within Memorandums of Understandings 
(MOUs) which form a condition upon which each year’s TAC is negotiated and 
agreed. 
 
While clearly a great step forward in the evolution of finer scale management within 
the abalone fishery the weakness of this approach is the difficulty of agreeing, 
orchestrating and enforcing complex codes of fine scale action amongst disparate 
groups of highly individualistic divers and quota owners. While the industry 
associations involved have already shown themselves capable of surprising levels of 
difficult decision making, doubt still remains as to whether groups of disparate quota 
owners and divers can act pro-actively enough against individual short term interests 
to halt the serial recruitment declines being observed in some parts of their fisheries. 
The inevitable tendency of a few individuals to ‘free-ride’ on the efforts of the 
majority and to disregard voluntary reef based LML or catch restrictions, especially 
towards the end of a TAC season, makes the task of the association’s executive 
officers in trying to co-ordinate the voluntary action particularly difficult. Beyond the 
impact on the resource of reefs most susceptible to over-fishing this ‘free-riding’ 
behavior undermines the integrity and purpose of the corporate group and puts into 
jeopardy its ability to make difficult decisions about future catch levels and LMLs, 
effectively slowing the process to the pace determine by the ‘lowest common 
denominator’ in each group.   
 
TERRITORIAL USER RIGHTS FISHERY 
There is no lack of will power and financial resources wishing to invest in 
conservative long term management and rebuilding of these resources. The current 
problem is that this will power, and any investment backing it, is placed in jeopardy 
by the, sometimes capricious and, unpredictable will of socially complex industry 
associations and management agencies. The trends being observed in these resources 
would be totally different if the management and ownership system were as simple as 
establishing a vineyard or plantation of timber. 
 
As proposed by Prince et al. (1998) moving towards a basis Territorial User Rights 
(TURF) by which operators would own and trade the exclusive harvesting and 
management rights to their own defined areas of reefs would overcome most of the 
existing challenges being faced by management in this fishery. In particular the use of 
market processes and forces would allow owners and divers to arrange themselves 
individually, and corporately, into entities with relatively homogenous interests in, 
and commitment to, management of the resource. Thus ‘free riding’ divers and anti-
conservative quota owners would find themselves impacting their own reefs, leaving 
more conscientious owners and divers to accept their own short term cut-backs in 
expectation of their own long term rewards.   
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While perhaps considered radical within the centralized government management 
context of most western fisheries there is considerable precedence for TURF style 
fisheries management (Prince 1998). Never-the-less a predictable range of issues are 
inevitably raised whenever changing the Australian or New Zealand abalone fisheries 
to a TURF based system of management is discussed. Most of the issues raised are 
simply expressions of the innate conservatism and fear of change felt by the existing 
quota owners, divers and managers who have historically fared very well under the 
status quo. Existing management agencies apparently fear loosing control over 
management, while quota owners have been happy with historic returns on their 
investment and apparently fear increasing the complexity and responsibility involved 
with managing their investments, while many divers value being able to range widely 
over the fishery and do not wish to have their existing freedom of movement 
curtailed. It is my observation that since first mooting the change to TURF 
management in the early 1990s (Prince et al. 1998) the strength of these objections 
have greatly diminished. This appears to be due to increasing awareness of the rate at 
which serial depletion is now occurring across these fisheries; the importance being 
placed upon ‘existing rights and freedoms’ (Hardin 1968) seems to be waning in the 
light of a growing desire to ensure a sustainable future. 
 
Another issue raised against the implementation of TURF management in the 
Australian abalone fishery is that of enforcement; how can private individuals and 
corporate groups hope to enforce their exclusive rights when government agencies are 
having such difficulty? Of course this is a substantive issue and it is not the intent here 
to delve extensively into this aspect of the issue. In the hope of summarily dealing 
with the issue of enforcing TURFs let it be noted that similar enforcement issues were 
faced in the terrestrial environment when grazing moved from free-ranging to 
enclosures but that law changes and legal support for private ownership largely 
overcame the issue over time – although some level of stock stealing does occur to the 
present day. Access to most abalone beds is only possible under certain weather 
conditions and local fishers are extremely adept at knowing when these occur. With 
access to modern remotely controlled surveillance technology and a law change which 
made geo-referenced video sufficient proof that an unauthorised person had broken 
the law by interfering with abalone in an area by molesting abalone. It would be 
hoped that resource thieves who might currently be threatened with apprehension 
once in one hundred times would be threatened with detection and prosecution on 
every occasion. Changing the enforcement dynamic in this way is probably the only 
way the existing and growing enforcement issues facing this fishery are ever going to 
be overcome. Supporting this contention is the fact that in North America where some 
beach clam fisheries are managed under TURF arrangements the management 
agencies claim that this form of management is made necessary by the impossibility 
of policing resource theft under any other form of management (Beattie et al. 1982, 
Bourne 1986). 
 
Having summarily and somewhat over-simplistically dealt with the other issues raised 
by proposing moving towards TURF management of the abalone fishery let us move 
on to the issues of primary interest in this context.  
 
ALLOCATING TERRITORIAL USER RIGHTS FOR ABALONE 
Reforming management of the abalone fishery into a TURF system raises the issue of 
how the existing variously defined shares of the abalone resource might be converted 
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into the spatially explicit shares which would be necessary to introduce a TURF 
system of management. Most obviously a process is required for the commercial 
sector to converting their existing shares of zonal or state wide Total Allowable 
Commercial Catch (TACC) into explicitly spatial allocations. However allocations to 
traditional, recreational and non-extractive sectors will also need to be made 
explicitly, rather than implicitly or cryptically as they are currently.  
 
Clearly the standards expected by our modern society and applicable to all these 
processes must be those that: 
• preserve the relative equity positions of all participants,  
• ensure the processes are free from manipulation by vested interest groups and  
• provides for transparency.  
 
Re-allocating the TACC 
When first confronted with the idea of converting the existing ITQ managed abalone 
fisheries to TURF management many people instinctively argue it is impossible 
because converting a mass based allocation into a spatial allocation one is impossible. 
 
However as far back as 1992 the President of the British Columbian Abalone 
Harvesters Association Mr Dan Pollock devised a workable process which conserved 
the necessary public standards of equity, transparency and being beyond manipulation 
(Prince 1998). The proposed method involved: (1) Grid the available coastline using 
an appropriately fine scale (1km2). (2) Each stakeholder assigns their own value (0-
10) to each square, zero indicating no value and ten indicating maximum value. (3) 
The total perceived value of each grid cell is determined by summing all assigned 
values. (4) The total perceived value of the fishery is estimated is determined by 
summing the totals of all grid cells. This value is then equated to the TACC. (5) A 
ballot is conducted which randomly selects grid cells for each quota owner such that 
the proportion of the perceived value of the fishery they receive is the same as the 
proportion of the TACC they owned. (6) Trading of spatial rights commences and 
resource owners begin trading spatial rights in order to configure their spatial 
allocation to suit their own needs.  
 
Steps 1-4 of this process were trialled in 2001 Paua 5B Zone of the New Zealand 
fishery as part of a consultancy for the New Zealand Paua Management Company. 
The process was used in that setting purely as a means of studying the fine scale 
distribution of abalone beds around Stewart Island. But when processed and 
summarised the knowledge and information provided by 6 commercial divers mapped 
the distribution of catches in a way that was convincing to other divers with 
considerable experience around the island. So this use of diver knowledge to allocate 
catch to areas does appear to be robust. 
 
In terms of practical implementation of this system it would probably be preferable to 
first perform the process in a workshop setting with the aim of sampling gaming the 
re-allocation process. This would allow the process to be trialled and developed if 
found necessary. It would also allow industry members to gain experience with the 
process and it is hoped some confidence being asked to commit large amounts of 
personal wealth to an untried process.  
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Where a reasonable time series of fine scale catch history data exists an alternative, 
but somewhat analogous process, might be applied which to streamline the process 
and avoid the appearance of ‘re-arranging’ existing property rights. This alternative 
could also provide for a slower evolution towards TURF management, rather than the 
essentially ‘big-bang’ approach proposed by Dan Pollock. Under this system the 
average catch of each fine scale statistical cell over some agreed period of time would 
be used to quantify the relative proportion of the TACC comprised by each cell i.e. 
Statistical Cell A, B, C, D contribute 10%, 15%, 25% and 50% of the TACC 
respectively. Entitlement holders would then have their existing licence or quota unit 
split proportionally into shares of each cell i.e. 10%, 15%, 25%, 50% of their licence, 
or of each Quota Unit the hold, would be held in Cells A, B, C, D respectively.  
 
In this system the statistical cells would effectively become units of TURF in which 
the resource owners would receive tradable shares. Under this system TURF 
management would evolve over time as individuals, corporate entities or co-operative 
groups moved in the market place to consolidate their ownership in specific locations. 
Management agencies could initially foster a proliferation of sub-zonal local area 
management groups to provide reasonably democratic proportional representation to 
what would initially be relatively diverse groups of owners in each location. 
Management agencies could track the process of consolidation within each TURF unit 
and where coherent and sophisticated local ownership and management emerged they 
gradually relinquishing control.  
 
Clearly if the aim is to promote individuals, corporate identities or small co-operative 
groups, taking responsibility for intelligently fine scale management of the resource 
using a larger number of smaller scale Statistical Cells will be preferable as the scale 
of the Statistical Cell used will eventually determine the scale of the smallest 
management unit, which in turn will influence to size and likely coherence of the 
entity which in time assumes responsibility for implementing fine scale management. 
Establishing such systems with a large number of smaller Statistical Cells may initial 
challenge the administrative capacity of existing management agencies because of the 
magnitude of trading that might ensue. Currently these agencies may be accustomed 
to handling the trade of a smaller volume of larger units being traded, however by 
‘grand-fathering’ in initially small shares of units, and establishing new minimum 
holding regulations, this situation might be made temporary rather than permanent, 
and the process of consolidating the ownership of TURF units might be fostered. 
 
Under this process it might also be envisaged that in some TURF units the process of 
consolidation may not proceed. This might be expected to occur in areas where 
prospective TURF owners lack confidence in their ability to control the resource; 
remote areas, or areas that are heavily impacted by recreational or illegal fisheries. In 
this setting it maybe that a form of financial risk management would be for a wide 
group of owners to retain small shares of these areas, rather than for a smaller group 
to attempt to consolidate ownership and accept the risk of loosing control of the 
production and management of the area. Such areas would provide some opportunity 
for those current owners and divers who do not wish to actively join the evolution of 
the fishery but wish to remain operating under the existing form of the fishery, 
although probably within a declining proportion of the fishery. In these areas 
management processes might remain much as they are at the current time with 
disparate groups struggling with decision making and engaging in difficult and at 
 7
times confusing negotiations with management agencies. In the long term areas that 
remain outside TURF management can be expected to suffer the impact of serial 
depletion of component abalone beds and so slowly decline in productivity. Where 
this occurs it might be come attractive enough in the long run for an entity to accept 
the risk of lack of control, and buy up the harvesting rights cheaply with the aim of 
long term rebuilding of stocks.  
 
Re-allocating Shares to the Non-commercial Sectors 
Across the abalone fisheries of Australia and New Zealand there is currently a 
considerable degree of re-allocation occurring between the commercial and non-
commercial sectors of the abalone fishery. These re-allocations are occurring 
incrementally and by stealth. None of the acceptable standards of equity, transparency 
and independence from special interest groups are being observed. 
 
Across the board the number of recreational fishers is growing rapidly. Controls on 
daily catches and possession limits are in place in all jurisdictions, but the number of 
days that can be dived is only controlled in suburban Western Australia and Victoria. 
To date no jurisdiction has contemplated how the absolute number of recreational 
divers can be managed and until this is done the recreational fishery effectively 
remains open access and its share of the resource beyond control. 
 
In Australia the claims process of the Traditional Sector has not advanced far enough 
to say much with any certainty. However, under the Treaty of Waitangi (Fisheries 
Claims) Settlement Act 1992 the New Zealand Ministry of Fisheries has enacted the 
Kaimoana Customary Fishing Regulations which provide for local tengata whenua 
claiming specific areas for their management under maitaitai reserves which generally 
excludes commercial fishing. The criteria for granting these claims pertain largely to 
demonstrating traditional ties and usage of areas, and are not particularly specific with 
regard to sustainability and equity. They should be consistent with sustainable use 
principles and should not ‘unreasonably prevent person with a commercial interest in 
a species from taking their quota or annual catch entitlement within the Quota 
Management Area’. Specifically there are no compensatory mechanisms in place 
when a TACC needs to be reduced to compensate for lost areas of productivity. 
 
In all jurisdictions across Australia and New Zealand there are also processes 
underway to declare Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) which will, or have already, 
alienated productive abalone beds from the TACC. Only in the jurisdiction of the 
Australian Commonwealth Government has a policy decision been made that the 
commercial sector should be compensated for losses incurred by this process. 
Recently in the Victorian jurisdiction the abalone sector was specifically and uniquely 
excluded from the process set up to compensate for the losses experienced by 
commercial fishers. Instead it was claimed that a generic compensation was being 
offered to the Victorian abalone industry through research grants aimed at locating 
previously undiscovered beds (which was unsuccessful) and through increased 
expenditure on enforcement which is meant to preserve the level of the TACC by 
taking indefinable catch share away from the indefinable illegal sector. 
 
Thus across the jurisdictions of Australia and New Zealand the commercial share of 
the abalone resource represented by the TACC is being steadily eroded by processes 
that remain opaque, inequitable and heavily driven by special interest groups.  
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In terms of the evolution of TURF management and its future operation the issue of 
MPAs and traditional users are most easily and satisfactorily dealt with. Both these 
sectors have compatibly spatially explicit claims on the resource. Where these are pre-
existing the allocation of TURF has already occurred. In the future where further 
claims for MPAs or traditional areas arise it would occur in the context of an explicit 
claim for the TURF of another defined owner. As with the expropriation of terrestrial 
property it would be explicit that the equity position of defined individuals was being 
adversely effected by the public desire for more MPAs and traditional areas, and that 
consequently the public purse should be used to compensate the individuals who are 
having their property taken. This would be in contrast to the current situation where 
because zonal TACCs are not spatially explicit a ‘polite fiction’ can be maintained by 
the political process that the alienation of productive commercial abalone beds by 
establishing MPAs and traditional areas, does not constitute the re-allocation of 
wealth from individuals in the commercial fishing sector, to individuals with interests 
in the traditional or the non-consumptive sector. 
 
Re-allocating the existing rights of the recreational sector raises more complex issues 
because the current recreational is currently unlimited and spatially undefined. In the 
interest of long term sustainability and the evolution of TURF management both these 
difficult issues should be addressed by explicitly defining areas for recreational 
abalone fishers distinct from areas of commercial TURF. This would explicitly cap 
the recreational share of the resource, and provide for security of tenure for 
commercial TURF owners, while leaving the issue of how recreational abalone 
fisheries can be sustainably managed, essentially unresolved. In this regard it can be 
argued that defining and separating recreational and commercial abalone fisheries 
might usefully shorten the recreational sector’s learning curve with regard to their role 
in the decline of certain abalone beds. Without the ability to continue moving away 
from depleted areas this sector might be forced to confront their own need to 
sustainably manage the beds they rely on and be encouraged to form local 
management committees. It can however be anticipated that existing recreational 
lobbies will vigorously defend their existing right to take abalone where ever they can 
still be found, but as with the commercial sector, this opinion can be expected to 
soften over time as the impact of serial depletion continues to erode the relative value 
of this existing right.  
 
In fact it would be possible to introduce TURF management to the commercial sector 
without explicitly addressing the issue of the recreational sector. Under this scenario it 
could be envisaged that the political process of a jurisdiction may decide that the 
recreational sector is too politically troublesome to attempt to restrict their existing 
right to range freely, while an enlightened commercial sector pushes for change 
regardless. In this scenario it can be expected that the impact of recreational pressure 
will be taken into account through the market for TURF and that abalone beds subject 
to extensive or damaging recreational pressure (or for that matter similar illegal 
pressure) will be devalued proportionally. Returning to the discussion above, under 
the more evolutionary approach to developing TURF management, it can be 
envisaged that areas where illegal and recreational pressure remains uncontrolled may 
well remain with more diffuse ownership arrangements as a risk management strategy 
by owners of TURF units. This may provide medium term mechanisms by which the 
commercial sector can move on to confronting the majority of their sustainability 
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issues but in the longest term exploitation levels the recreational sector will also need 
to be controlled sustainably.   
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Developing an appropriate scale of management for the abalone fishery will require 
enlisting and motivating the intelligent action of individual divers as they select 
abalone to harvest. An evolutionary process is needed in the fishery to change divers 
from hunters to gardeners. This will require changing the current ITQ management 
into a system of tradable exclusive harvesting rights raising a range of allocation and 
re-allocation issues. None of these allocations issues are insoluble and as the resource 
continues decline the will to find solutions is bound to increase.  
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